Showing posts with label Delay Damages. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Delay Damages. Show all posts

Friday, March 23, 2018

Federal Circuit Affirms Absence of Differing Site Condition But Remands for Delay Claim

Mary C. Oswell collection, Bonita Museum,
available at http://sunnycv.com/southbay/exhibits/water.html 
The case Meridian Eng'g Co. v. United States, No. 2017-1584, 2018 WL 1386147, at *10 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 2018) concerned a dispute between the federal government and a contractor related to the construction of flood control structures and the relocation of a sewer line in Chula Vista near San Diego, California.  After starting work, the contractor encountered "subsurface organic/unsuitable material” and “a layer of dripping saturated dark clay material under which a clean layer of sand is producing water.”  As a result the parties modified the contract - selecting larger pipes, reinforced concrete, more soil investigation, but to no avail.  The project was terminated after further structural failures.  The contractor then sought extra costs for what it deemed a Type I differing site condition ("DSC") and for delay costs for inclement weather. The Court of Federal Claims denied the claims and the contractor appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  The Appeals Court reviewed for "clear error."

Under this federal contract, a Type I DSC claim arises when the subsurface or latent physical conditions at the site differ materially from those indicated in the contract documents.  The Appeals Court recounted that typically whether "a contract contained indications of a particular site condition is a matter of contract interpretation." Id.  As part of its burden of proof, the contractor needed to show it acted as "a reasonable contractor [when] reading the contract documents as a whole [and] interpret[ing] them as making a representation as to the site conditions.”  Besides reliance on the contract and proof of damages, the contractor also needed to prove that “the actual site conditions were not reasonably foreseeable to the contractor with the information available to the particular contractor outside the contract documents” as well. Id.  The Appeals Court agreed with trial court's conclusion that the saturated soil conditions were reasonably foreseeable from the contract documents.  In particular, the contract stated that the worksite was located on a floodplain and the descriptions of the incorporated boring logs expressly stated that "variations may exist in the subsurface between boring locations."  The court also emphasized that "actual conditions at the site indicated such [saturated] conditions" and the contractor was charged with knowing information that could be gleaned from a pre-bid site visit.  The court found important that there was no testimony from the contractor otherwise regarding the actual conditions.

For the contractor's part, it argued that the contract had identified the areas of the project as "hard unyielding material.”  But the Appeals Court was unpersuaded in the face of disclaimer contract provisions noting "unstable material" and boring logs that were determined to indicate otherwise. The contractor also balked that trial court found that an "independent soils investigation" was something a reasonable contractor would have performed.  Again the Appeals Court disagreed concluding that the underlying decision actually did "not impose an improper requirement for investigation." Lastly, the Appeals Court disposed of the contractor's argument that the agreed-to modifications to the contract served as admissions by the government that a Type I DSC existed because "a contractor is not entitled to the benefit of any presumption arising from the [CO]'s decision." Id.

Although the contractor did not prevail on the DSC claim, the Appeals Court did breathe new life into the delay claim for having to work in inclement weather.  The trial court had dismissed this claim as well on account of an "accord and satisfaction" as a result of contract modifications. However, the Appeals Court disagreed noting that the contract modification did not represent a meeting of the minds to dispose of these inclement weather delay claims especially in light of the government's actions post-modification - requests for estimates, draft modifications with these claims included, offer to review further documentation.  Accordingly this delay claim was remanded for further hearings.

 ---------------------------------------------
The author, Katharine Kohm, Esq. is a committee member for The Dispute Resolver.  She practices construction law at Pierce Atwood, LLP in Providence, Rhode Island.
  
 

Wednesday, January 24, 2018

Midwinter Meeting - D1 Breakfast Program - Getting it Right Early: Expert Retention Best Practices

It's no secret that construction disputes frequently involve one or more expert witnesses on each side. Our Division 1 panel -- Joshua B. Levy of Husch Blackwell LLP and Bill Manginelli and Mary Jay Torres-Martin both from Trauner Consulting Services, Inc. -- offered some best practices for those expert engagements starting at the initial meeting through the expert's trial testimony.

Joshua Levy and Bill Manginelli

Using a creative presentation approach (and apropos for the upcoming 2018 Winter Olympics), Joshua, Bill, and Mary Jay set the scene for a dispute between Olympic Mechanical and Bobsled Contractors over the mechanical subcontractor's claimed costs for extra work and delay.  Joshua served as counsel for the defendant Bobsled Contractors and Bill was Bobsled's expert.  Over the course of three acts marshaled by Mary Jay, Joshua and Bill held mock meetings to discuss the claims, exchange of documentation, initial opinions, written reports, and preparation for depositions and trial. The pair offered important and practical reminders to ensure the expert testimony will meet the requirements of the rules of evidence and civil procedure.  As a coda to the presentation, Eric J. Meier also from Husch Blackwell LLP, played the opposing expert for Olympic and faced stiff cross-examination from Joshua.  This mock cross-examination illustrated the worst case scenario if best (or even good) practices for preparing experts are not followed.  

Saturday, April 22, 2017

Increased Workforce Is Not "Delay" - Massachusetts Appeals Court affirms subcontractor award despite no-damage-for-delay clause

In Central Ceilings, Inc. v. Suffolk Construction Company, Inc., et al., - N.E.3d - 91 Mass.App.Ct. 231 (Mar. 29, 2017), the Massachusetts Appellate Court affirmed a $321,315 damages award against a general contractor in favor of a subcontractor.  The subcontractor claimed that as a result of the general contractor's mismanagement of the dormitory construction project (at Westfield State University) it was less productive and therefore incurred costs. 

Indeed the subcontractor, who installed exterior and interior wall systems, illustrated that properly sequencing its work "floor by floor, exterior to interior, building by building" was key to meeting its cost and time bid. The evidence presented showed that general contractor "struggled" coordinate the other trades who needed to complete their work before the subcontractor could begin, failed to timely survey the locations for the subcontractor to line up its panels, delayed making the building weather tight, among other delays.  The delays caused the subcontractor to perform costly extra work mobilizing and demobilizing and to incur project administration costs.  In addition, the subcontractor was not given extra time to do this work due to the looming liquidated damages that the general contractor would owe if the project was not completed on time (though the general contractor later attempted to dispute that the subcontractor had ever asked for extra time).  Instead the subcontractor was "compressed" and forced to assign, and pay for, extra personnel on the project. To support its claim, the subcontractor introduced an expert who opined, using the total cost method, that the loss was "best quantified through the impact it had on [the subcontractor's] manpower." After confirming the subcontractor's bid was "reasonable," he examined what the subcontractor actually spent to complete the project, what change orders were already paid, and concluded that the difference, $321,315, was the subcontractor's lost productivity.

In response, the general contractor pointed to the contract's no-damages-for-delay clause and asserted that the demanded recovery was wholly precluded. In pertinent part, the clause stated:
The Subcontractor agrees that it shall have no claim for money damages or additional compensation for delay no matter how caused, but for any delay or increase in the time required for performance of this Subcontract not due to the fault of the Subcontractor, the Subcontractor shall be entitled only to an extension of time for performance of its Work. Written notice of all claims for any extension of time shall be submitted to Contractor within ten (10) days of the date when Subcontractor knows (or should know) of the event which causes such delay, or such claim shall be considered waived by Subcontractor
The trial judge held, and the appellate court affirmed, that the unambiguous provision was inapplicable to the subcontractor's claim for two reasons.

First, the only remedy under the no-damages-for-delay clause was the extension of time but, here, no extensions were allowed in contravention to the agreement. The general contractor protested on appeal that no extension requests from the subcontractor were ever received, but the general contractor did not raise that issue at the trial court and the record belied that position anyway.  

Second, the trial court held and the appellate court affirmed that in strictly construing the draconian language of the clause, the subcontractor's damages claimed, lost productivity, were not "for delay" (precluded by the clause) but rather "it had been forced to increase its workforce due to the compression of the schedule occasioned by [the general contractor's] breaches" (not precluded by the clause). The trial court observed that the general contractor's "breaches did not affect [the subcontractor's] ability to complete its work on time . . . but, rather, with its ability to complete its work on budget."

Accordingly the award, and the total cost method for calculating the award, were affirmed.
--------------------------
The author, Katharine Kohm, is a committee member for The Dispute Resolver. Katharine practices construction law and commercial litigation in Rhode Island and Massachusetts. She is an associate at Pierce Atwood, LLP in Providence, Rhode Island. She may be contacted at 401-490-3407 or kkohm@PierceAtwood.com.

Monday, October 20, 2014

No-Damages-For-Delay Provision Does Not Shield Owner from Liability for Deliberate Interference With a Contractor’s Work.

In a much-anticipated decision, the Texas Supreme Court has ruled in favor of a general contractor seeking to recover funds withheld by an owner for delays that the jury found were caused by the owner’s deliberate and wrongful interference. The Court addressed the effect of a no-damages-for-delay provision in the construction contract, as well as whether language in the waivers the contractor submitted for progress payments also waived the contractor’s claims for delay damages. Finally, the Court analyzed at length whether the applicable statutes waived the governmental immunity of the owner, a local port authority.

Background

Zachry Construction Corporation agreed to construct a wharf for the Port of Houston Authority for over $62 million. The construction contract gave Zachry control over the means and methods of the work. It also stated that Zachry could not recover any damages from delays in the work, even if the delays resulted from “the negligence, breach of contract or other fault of the Port Authority.” The parties agreed to a provision that permitted the Port to recover its attorneys’ fees from Zachry if Zachry brought an unsuccessful claim under the contract.

As part of the construction of the wharf, Zachry planned to utilize an innovative technique that involved creating a long U-shaped berm made of frozen earth that would extend into the water to surround the worksite. Water would then be removed from the worksite, allowing Zachry to work “in the dry” for much of the construction work. Zachry believed that this technique would make the work less expensive, complete it more quickly, and provide environmental benefits to the Port.

Nine months into the project, the Port asked Zachry to add another section to the wharf, expanding the scope of the project by almost $13 million. To continue to meet the time deadlines in the project, Zachry proposed building a cutoff wall through the middle of the worksite, splitting the work area into two parts. Though the Port had reservations about this plan, it did not raise its concern before the parties executed the change order.

Two weeks later, the Port ordered Zachry to revise its plans to remove the cutoff wall. This forced Zachry to finish only a portion of the wharf “in the dry,” and then to remove the wall. The remainder of the project had to be finished “in the wet,” resulting in a delay of about two and a half years.

Zachry sued the Port several weeks after its refusal to allow construction of the cutoff wall. Zachry claimed about $30 million in delay damages. The Port argued that the contract precluded delay damages. The trial court disagreed, finding that the provision unenforceable if Zachry showed that the Port’s intentional misconduct caused the delay.

Zachry also sought to recover about $2.36 million in contract funds withheld by the Port as liquidated damages for delays. In response, the Port argued that Zachry had waived its claims by submitting applications for progress payments that included releases of certain claims. The trial court found the waiver language ambiguous and submitted the issue of its meaning to the jury.

In its defense, the Port contended that governmental immunity precluded Zachry’s claims. The Port also counterclaimed for close to $1 million in repair costs to remedy defective wharf fenders installed at the project, and for all of its attorneys’ fees under a contract provision that permitted the Port to recover all attorneys’ fees for any of Zachry’s claims that were not successful.

After a trial, a jury found that the Port breached the contract by rejecting the cutoff wall design, causing about $18.6 million in delay damages. According to the jury, the delay resulted from the Port’s “arbitrary and capricious conduct, active interference, bad faith and/or fraud.” The jury found that Zachry had not released its claim to the withheld funds, but also found in favor of the Port on the counterclaims for defective work.

On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the judgment in favor of Zachry. It found that the no-damages-for-delay provision barred any recovery of delay damages, regardless of whether the Port had intentionally or arbitrarily caused the delays. The court also held that the progress-payment releases were unambiguous and precluded any claims for the withheld funds. Finally, the court of appeals rendered judgment in favor of the Port on its claim for attorneys’ fees, awarding the Port almost $10.7 million.

Summary of the Texas Supreme Court’s holdings

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that:
  1. The no-damage-for-delays language did not apply, as a matter of public policy, to claims for delays caused by the owner’s intentional or arbitrary interference;
  2. The actual waiver that the contractor signed for the progress payments was not ambiguous, and it did not waive the claims for the withheld claims;
  3. Governmental immunity did not bar the contractor’s delay claims;
  4. The Port was entitled to recover on its defective-work claims; and
  5. The Port was not entitled to the award of attorneys’ fees.

Though the decision was 5-4, the dissent agreed with the majority on points 2 and 4, above. The dissent primarily concerned the governmental immunity issue (point 3), and thus did not reach the public-policy issue (point 1).

A contractor cannot waive claims for delays caused by the owner’s intentional or arbitrary interference

The Court found the no-damages-for-delay provision unenforceable against delay claims based on the owner’s intentional or reckless misconduct. While a contractor generally may agree to assume the risk of construction delays, exceptions to their enforcement apply where the delay resulted from the owner’s fraud, misrepresentation, or bad faith, or where the delay resulted from the owner’s active interference or other wrongful conduct, which includes arbitrary acts, willful misconduct, acting without due consideration, and acting in disregard of other parties’ rights. As the jury found that the Port caused the delays through “arbitrary and capricious conduct, active interference, bad faith and/or fraud,” the Court found that the Port could not enforce the provision against Zachry.

The Court noted that it was “doubtful” that the waiver of delay damages due to the Port’s “negligence, breach of contract or other fault” would even apply to deliberate, wrongful misconduct. It cited an amicus brief from the Associated General Contractors of Texas, which pointed out that contractors can (and often do) include in their estimates potential delaying events such as quality and completeness of plans and specifications, material shortages, weather issues, and soil conditions. These foreseeable issues can be taken into account using the contractors’ years of experience, education, and training. But no contractor can accurately assess potential delays “that may arise due to an owner’s direct interference, willful acts, negligence, bad faith fraudulent acts, and/or omissions.”

Under Texas law, contractual provisions seeking to exempt a party from tort liability for its own future intentional or reckless misconduct are void as against public policy. The Court applied the same rule to contract liability, to avoid “incentiviz[ing] wrongful conduct and damag[ing] contractual relations.” Even though Texas, unlike many other states, does not impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of all contracts, the Court found such a duty unnecessary to prohibit provisions allowing a contracting party to evade liability for deliberate misconduct in the future.

A contractual requirement for the contractor to waive claims does not prevail over the actual language of the waivers signed

Next, the Court reversed the court of appeals’ ruling that Zachry had waived its claims for the $2.36 million that the Port withheld as liquidated damages. The Court disagreed with the trial court’s finding that the waiver language was ambiguous, instead holding that language unambiguously did not include Zachry’s claims. In particular, the progress-payment application released claims on “the portion of the Work completed and listed on” the invoice. The liquidated damages withheld by the Port, in contrast, were for delayed work that had not been completed, rather than work already finished.

Interestingly, the Court admitted that Zachry’s underlying construction contract could be read to require Zachry to waive such claims when it applied for progress payments. However, the language in the waiver Zachry actually submitted (whether it complied with the contract or not) did not encompass the claims for the withheld funds.

The Texas Supreme Court narrowly held that there was no governmental immunity for the contractor’s delay claims under these circumstances

Finally, a large portion of the majority, and the entire dissent, focused on whether the Texas legislature had waived the Port’s governmental immunity for Zachry’s delay claims. A more detailed examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this post, but the dispute concerned a statute waiving the governmental immunity of a local governmental entity for a contractor’s claims for its “balance due and owed . . . under the contract.” The majority and the dissent agreed that this issue was jurisdictional, but disagreed on whether delay damages were “owed under the contract” where, as here, the contract expressly prohibited delay damages. The majority found that such damages fell within the scope of the waiver.

Parties to construction contracts could use the public-policy exception to avoid damage waivers

This decision could significantly narrow the enforcement of contract provisions limiting recovery of damages in Texas. With some exceptions, Texas has prohibited contractual provisions that require a contractor to indemnify another person for property damage resulting in whole or in part from the fault of the other person, its agent, or its employee. Tex. Ins. Code § 151.102. The Zachry decision adds a public-policy exception invalidating waivers of damages caused by intentional or reckless misconduct. Contractors could argue that this exception applies to more than delay claims. For example, a waiver of consequential damages could be invalidated if a general contractor showed that the owner’s intentional or reckless misconduct caused the damages. Moreover, the Court’s reasoning might apply to conduct that is less culpable than recklessness, such as acting “without due consideration,” arbitrarily, or “in disregard of other parties’ rights.”