Friday, July 1, 2016

Fifth Circuit Considers Allocation of Risk of Defective Plans and Specifications in Reversing $1.29 Million Judgment Entered in Favor of Contractor

Jeffery R. Mullen, Associate, Pepper Hamilton LLP

Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Board v. INET Airport Systems, Inc., et al., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6646, 819 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. Apr. 12, 2016)

This action arose out of a construction project in terminal E of the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (“DFW”), in which pre-conditioned air and rooftop air handling units were to provide conditioned air (cooling and heating) to passenger boarding bridges and aircrafts parked at terminal gates (the “Project”).  In August, 2009, following a competitive bidding process, owner Dallas Fort Worth International Airport Board (the “Owner”) entered into a contract with contractor INET Airport Systems, Inc. (the “Contractor”) to construct the Project. The plans and specifications for the contract included detailed drawings, the precise rooftop units and parts to be used, approved manufacturers and performance requirements.  Under the contract and these plans, the Contractor was obligated to install operational rooftop units that were required to use 30 percent ethylene glycol/water supplied through DFW’s existing piping system. The Contractor was not allowed to substitute products or designs for those agreed upon in the contract documents without authorization from the Owner. The contract also required that if anything in the agreed-upon plans needed to be changed, the Contractor would alert the Owner and the parties would collaborate to come up with a workaround that would be incorporated into the contract by written change order issued by the Owner with agreed prices for performing the change order work.

Trouble arose when the Contractor expressed concern that the rooftop units specified in the plans might not function properly with the ethylene glycol/water mixture supplied by DFW’s existing piping system.  In an October 2009 construction kick-off meeting, the Contractor advised the Owner that the plans needed adjusting because the coolant used in the rooftop units was kept at sub-zero temperatures, risking a damaging freeze.  After receiving no immediate response to this concern, the Contractor submitted a request for information asking how it should proceed.  The parties’ ensuing discussions resulted in two proposals for how to add control sequences (“Control Sequence Proposal”) or revised piping (“Revised Piping Proposal”) to the units to prevent potential problems.  While the Contractor rejected the Control Sequence Proposal, the record was unclear as to what happened with the Revised Piping Proposal, other than that the parties did not formally price the change or incorporate it into their contract. Despite significant communication on the matter, the parties were never able to agree on how to proceed.  Months later, the Owner told the Contractor it failed to meet the substantial completion deadline and subsequently refused to pay at least two invoices from the Contractor.   In 2012, after contracting with another company to complete the construction, the Owner initiated litigation against the Contractor in which each party accused the other of breaching the contract.  Both the Owner and the Contractor moved for summary judgment on their claims.

The district court determined that the case turned on which party first breached the contract and concluded that the contract placed the risk of defects in the designs and specifications on the Owner, that the Owner had admitted the designs and specifications were defective, and that the Owner therefore breached the contract by failing to acknowledge the defects and issue appropriate change orders.  As a result, the district court granted summary judgment for the Contractor and, after a bench trial on damages, awarded damages and attorneys’ fees to the Contractor in the amount of $1.29 million.  The Owner appealed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded it was error for the district court to grant summary judgment for the Contractor because the record contained disputed facts regarding which party first prevented performance by failing to fully cooperate in arriving at a solution once the parties discovered defects in the plans and specifications.  Finding that there was no dispute that the plans and specifications were defective, the Court focused on which party was responsible under the contract for defective plans and specification and what the contract required of each party once the Contractor alerted the Owner to a defect that would prevent its performance.

First, the Court disagreed with the district court’s finding that the contract allocated the risk of defective plans and specifications solely to the Owner.  The Court found that while the Owner partly bore the risk of defective plans and specifications, the contract allocated some duties to the Contractor as well, duties that required the Contractor to cooperate or take other actions in this case to help resolve the discrepancy between the contract’s requirements and the plans and specifications.  For example, the Court noted that if the engineer or the Owner determined that changes were necessary after the Contractor pointed out a potential error, the contract required that the parties mutually agree upon the workaround and how to adjust for the change or modify the contract.  Thus, the Court concluded that the contract contained a mixture of provisions that placed the risk of defects on both the Owner and the Contractor, and that both parties had a duty to cooperate in finding a solution to the defect.

The Court then considered which party breached the contract by failing to participate in resolving the defect and agreeing to the associated change order or modification to the contract. The Contractor acknowledged that it rejected the Control Sequence Proposal, but pointed to requests for information to support its claim that the Owner breached the contract by failing to issue a change order and incorporate the Revised Piping Proposal into the contract.  However, the Owner argued that the Contractor had rejected the Revised Piping Proposal as well, pointing to correspondence between the parties and deposition testimony on the subject.  The Court found that this non-conclusory evidence created a dispute of material fact as to whether the Contractor rejected the Revised Piping Proposal outright or hindered the process of agreeing to this or another solution.  The Court concluded that, “[s]ifting through the evidence to determine whether the parties reached agreement on a contractual modification is a task ill-suited for summary judgment on this record. For these reasons, and because disputes of material fact remain regarding whether [the Owner] or [the Contractor] breached the contract by preventing an agreement about how to address defects in the contract’s plans and specifications, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment for [the Contractor].”

Consequently, the Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Contractor and remanded the case for the breach of contract claims to proceed to a fact finder.

Article originally posted June 28, 2016 on Constructlaw, an update and discussion of recent trends in construction law and construction, maintained and edited by Pepper Hamilton's Construction Law Practice Group. 

Thursday, June 23, 2016

Pair of Cases Concerning Pay-if-Paid Provisions

Within the last month, two decisions with two outcomes were issued concerning "pay-if-paid" provisions. Observe that a "pay-if-paid" provision is a true condition precedent in that a general contractor is not required to pay its subcontractor unless and until it receives payment from the owner.  A different result flows from a "pay-when-paid" provision which only allows the general contractor a reasonable time to pay the subcontractor after receiving payment from the owner, but the risk of non-payment from the owner is not shifted to the subcontractor.

In Midlantic Fire, LLC v. Ernest Bock & Sons, Inc., No. DC–8529–14, 2016 WL 3093075, at *1 (N.J.Super. Ct. June 3, 2016), the pay-if-paid clause stated:
Payment by Owner to the General Contractor for the work/materials invoiced by the Subcontractor/Supplier shall be a condition precedent to General Contractor's obligation to pay Subcontractor/Supplier. Accordingly Subcontractor/Supplier agrees and understands that it shall bear the risk of non-payment by the Owner and shall be entitled to no compensation from the General Contractor in the event of non-payment by the Owner for its work/materials.
The plaintiff subcontractor installed a fire protection system in accordance with drawings and plans supplied by the defendant general contractor.  Subsequent to installation, the general contractor learned that the sprinklers interfered with structural supports that needed to be installed.  The subcontractor issued a change order, which was approved by the general contractor.  The subcontractor performed the changed work.  When the general contractor submitted the invoice for payment, the owner declined to pay because there was a "lack of communication [and] coordination" between the general contractor and subcontractor. The general contractor, citing the pay-if-paid provision, then refused to pay the subcontractor.   The plaintiff subcontractor prevailed at trial, and the defendant general contractor appealed the application of the pay-if-pay by law.

Applying Pennsylvania law, per the contract, the court affirmed in favor of the subcontractor because "courts are reluctant to enforce a conditional payment provision against an unpaid subcontractor that is not responsible for the condition giving rise to the payment defense" and because "parties to a contract have an implied duty not to frustrate conditions precedent to their performance" (citing Quinn Constr., Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 730 F.Supp.2d 401, 420 (E.D.Pa.2010)).  Because the subcontractor had relied on the plans and drawings submitted by the general contractor and therefore because all coordination among subcontractors was the general contractor's responsibility, the subcontractor was not responsible for the non-payment. Rather the defendant general contractor's own error spurred the need for the change order and the owners refusal to pay the change order. As such, the pay-if-paid provision was inapplicable and the general was required to pay the subcontractor.

In A. Zahner Company v. McGowan Builders, Inc., No. WD 78063, 2016 WL 2994022, (Mo.App. Ct May 24, 2016), the pay-if-paid stated:
[Subcontractor] agrees that [the general contractor] will not be responsible to make any payment, progress or final, to [subcontractor] for any and all of the goods identified in this Purchase Order unless and until [general contractor] receives payment for such goods from the Owner of the project . . . . If Subcontractor is not paid within 45 days of when a pay application is submitted, Subcontractor may stop the Work of this Subcontract until payment is received . . . .
The trial court had concluded that the above provision was ambiguous because the "unless and until" language was a condition precedent to payment shifting the risk of non-payment to the subcontractor whereas the "stop the Work" sentences "eased the burden" of risk to the subcontractor.  The appellate court disagreed and instead held that the entire provision could be read harmoniously. That court held that altogether the provision simply "distributes financial risk between the parties and provides both [with] a measure of financial protection."  In sum, the general contractor did not need to pay if owner did not pay.  As its recourse, the subcontractor did not need to continue work if it was not paid.  As such, the appellate court concluded that the pay-if-paid provision was applicable and remanded the case for fact-finding -- whether the owner indeed did not pay the general contractor.
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The author, Katharine Kohm, is a committee member for The Dispute Resolver. Katharine practices construction law and commercial litigation in Rhode Island and Massachusetts.  She is an associate at Pierce Atwood, LLP in Providence, Rhode Island.  She may be contacted at 401-490-3407 or kkohm@PierceAtwood.com.


Friday, June 17, 2016

Ohio Supreme Court Reinstates Assessment of Liquidated Damages Equal to 40% of Original Contract Value in Public Works Project

In Boone Coleman Construction, Inc. v. TheVillage of Piketon (2016 Ohio 628), the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed its liquidated damages precedents within the context of a public works project for the first time.  The matter stems from the award of a $638,000 public works contract for the installation of a new traffic light and associated roadway improvements with a substantial completion duration of 120 days.  Contained within the contract was a liquidated damages provision in the amount of $700 per day for each day after the substantial completion date.  The project’s date of commencement was set for July 30, 2007 putting substantial completion on November 27, 2007.  Boone Coleman was granted an initial extension to May 30, 2008, but its second request for an extension was denied and Piketon put Boone Coleman on notice that liquidated damages would be sought for every day after May 30, 2008.  The project eventually reached substantial completion on July 2, 2009, 397 days after the schedule extension date of May 30, 2008.

Boone Coleman brought suit against Piketon for not paying $144,477 of construction costs and Piketon countered in the amount of $277,900 for liquidated damages.  The trial court granted Piketon’s motion for summary judgment and awarded liquidated damages.   The appeals court reversed that decision and found the liquidated damages to be “unreasonable and disproportionate.”  Piketon appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The Court stated it would review the case for two propositions of law: 1) courts must review the validity of liquidated damages prospectively, not retrospectively, and 2) liquidated damages are not deemed to be a penalty simply because the construction is new and actual damages cannot be presented. It began by defining liquidated damages and pointed to Ohio’s three part test for determining whether a contract term is a liquidated damage or a penalty.  A term is a liquidated damage if:

(1)   [Damages are] uncertain as to amount and difficult of proof.

(2) The contract as a whole is not so manifestly unconscionable, unreasonable, and disproportionate in amount as to justify the conclusion that it does not express the true intention of the parties.

(3) The contract is consistent with the conclusion that it was the intention of the parties that damages in the amount stated should follow the breach thereof.

The Court next discussed the inclusion of liquidated damage provisions in public works contracts.  The Court stated that, “The Supreme Court and many state and federal appellate courts also recognize that liquidated-damages provision in public contracts are particularly valuable given the unique difficulty in calculating the damages associated with a public contractor’s breach of its promise to timely complete a public improvement project.”  The Court then pointed to the statutory requirement passed by the Ohio legislature requiring public-improvement-construction contracts contain a liquidate damages provision.

The appeals court determined that the first and third parts of the above three part test were satisfied in the contract and the Court concurred, but it also found that the appeals court erred in determining the second part was not fulfilled.  The Court identified the fact that the appeals court incorrectly focused its analysis on the total amount of liquidated damages and not the per diem amount when it concluded that the provision was an unenforceable penalty. The Court stated, “[h]ere the appellate court improperly engaged in retrospective analysis, i.e., it looked, with hindsight, to the aggregate application of the per diem liquidated damages to conclude that the provision was unconscionable.  But it did not determine that the per diem amount was unconscionable at the time the parties entered into the contract.”

The Court further mused that with the appellate court’s reasoning, had the delay been only a few days and the liquidated damages did not accumulate to the level in the present matter, then the provision might have been enforceable. The court found this to be unacceptable so as to “relieve a breaching party of the consequences it agreed to by refusing to enforce a per diem liquidated-damages provision solely because the breach was an egregious one.” 


The Court vacated the judgment of the appellate court and remanded.

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The author, Brendan Carter, is a contributor to The Dispute Resolver and a former Student Division Liaison to the Forum on Construction Law.  He is an attorney and a Senior Consultant with Navigant’s Global Construction Practice based out of Boston, MA.  He may be contacted at 617.748.8311 or brendan.carter@navigant.com.

Friday, June 10, 2016

Division 1 Steering Committee Meeting Minutes - May 16, 2016


Moving forward we will be posting the Division 1 Steering Committee Meeting Minutes to the Blog.  Here is a link to the Minutes from our May 16, 2016 Meeting. 

Wednesday, June 1, 2016

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Provides Guidance on Accrual of Pass-Through Subcontractor Claims

In Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. Murphy, the timeliness of prime contractor Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.’s (“KBR”) May 2, 2012, claim to the Army was sole issue on appeal - particularly, whether KBR’s claim had accrued on or before May 2, 2006, for purposes of the Contract Disputes Act’s (“CDA”) 6-year statute of limitations.   The court held that the 6-year statute of limitations had not run.

The project at issue involved KBR’s contract with the Army to construct dining facilities and provide meal and related services for troops in Iraq.  KBR subcontracted with a joint venture between The Kuwait Company for Process Plant Construction & Contracting K.S.C. and Morris Corporation (AUST) PTY Ltd. (“KCPC/Morris”) to implement certain work release orders for the project.  On July 31, 2003, KBR terminated KCPC/Morris for alleged default.  KCPC/Morris disputed the termination but continued performance until transition to a new subcontractor on September 12, 2003.

In 2004, KCPC/Morris filed suit against KBR in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia based on the termination.  In the suit, KBR claimed that KBR and KCPC/Morris had reached an oral settlement and sought to enforce it.  On January 24, 2005, KBR and KCPC/Morris reached an agreement dividing KCPC/Morris’ alleged costs into two categories and converting the default termination to a termination for convenience.

As part of the agreement, KBR and KCPC/Morris agreed to cooperate to prepare invoices to the Army for KCPC/Morris’ termination costs.  On August 26, 2006, KCPC/Morris submitted to KBR a certified claim.  On November 3, 2006, KBR forwarded KCPC/Morris’ claim to the Army, but KBR did not certify the claim. 

The Army responded on May 30, 2007, that KBR was responsible for negotiating and discussing claims with its subcontractors and that the Army does not comment in advance whether a claim or costs are appropriate.  The Army also refused to meet with or correspond directly with KCPC/Morris.  The Army directed KBR to settle with KCPC/Morris, and then submit a claim to the Army.

On October 10, 2007, KBR “sponsored” KCPC/Morris’ claim and certified the claim on January 10, 2008.  However, on September 8, 2010, KBR withdrew the claim, stating it was a business dispute between KBR and KCPC/Morris.

On August 4, 2011, KCPC/Morris filed suit against KBR in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia regarding KBR’s handling and submission of KCPC/Morris’ claim to the Army.  KBR and KCPC/Morris ultimately settled the suit, and then on May 2, 2012, KBR submitted a certified claim with the Army for the settlement amount.  The contracting officer did not act on the claim, thereby placing it in the “deemed denied” status.  KBR appealed to the Board.

The CDA requires that a claim “shall be submitted within 6 years after the accrual of the claim”.  41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A).  The Army claimed that the 6-year CDA statute of limitations had run and moved to dismiss.  The Board granted the Army’s motion, finding alternative dates for the accrual of the claim - the first on September 12, 2003, when KCPC/Morris ended its work, and the second on January 24, 2005, when KPB and KCPC/Morris agreed to submit KCPC/Morris’ alleged termination costs to the Army.  Both dates preceded the critical limitations date of May 2, 2006.

The court noted that the FAR defines “accrual” of a claim as:

the date when all events, that fix the alleged liability of either the Government or the contractor and permit assertion of the claim, were known or should have been known.  For liability to be fixed, some injury must have occurred.  However, monetary damages need not have been incurred.
48 C.F.R. § 33.201.  The court also noted that the FAR, the conditions of the contract, and the facts of a particular case determine when a CDA claim accrues.

KBR argued that until KBR determined the amount of payment KBR would request from the Army, the claim did not yet exist and could not accrue.  KBR argued that until KCPC/Morris provided its costs on August 26, 2006, which KBR ultimately included in KBR’s certified claim to the Army, the claim had not accrued.

The Army presented a theory, which the Board adopted, that the payment of the remaining subcontractor costs following the termination was a “non-routine” request for payment, which accrued as of the date the subcontractor ended its work, in this case, on September 12, 2003.  The Army based its theory on jurisprudence that allows a contractor to immediately seek payment of damages flowing from some unexpected or unforeseen action of the government.  However, the court noted that termination of a subcontractor is not an unforeseen government action.

The court further noted that the limitations period does not begin to run if a claim cannot be filed because of mandatory pre-claim procedures, and here, the Army required KBR to resolve the disputed costs with KCPC/Morris, then submit the claim to the Army.

The court also rejected the Army’s various alternative theories of claim accrual and ultimately reversed the Board’s dismissal and remanded the case to the Board to determine the claim merits.  The court did not identify the date that KBR’s claim did accrue, only that the claim had not accrued before the critical May 2, 2006, date.

For your reference, linked here is a copy of the May 18, 2016, decision.

Thursday, May 19, 2016

Dispute Avoidance for LEED Projects

In this final LEED-focused post (see post #1 and post #2), we consider dispute avoidance in the context of green-building construction contracts.  Like all projects, disputes often arise when expectations are not met. LEED projects are no different.  Parties are best served and disputes avoided when obligations and contingencies are laid out ahead of time.  For example, the AIA has adopted a guide and contract language to address and avoid disputes in this specialized context.  See AIA D503 (collecting the various Sustainable Project (SP) agreements including owner-architect, architect-consultant, owner-contractor, contractor-subcontractor).  Note that the AIA does not endorse any particular certification and its documents can be tailored regardless of the certification system selected. Below are some key contractual considerations related to disputes on green projects through the lens of owners, contractors, and architects:


(1) Define Consequences. A mutual waiver of consequential damages provision is common in construction contracts. But for green projects, it is important to define what those consequential (and non-recoverable items) are. For example, not achieving a certain threshold of energy savings, spending more on operational costs than anticipated, missed financial or tax incentives, or disappointing improvements to employee production might fit the definition.  In the event these items are intended to avoid the waiver and are recoverable, deciding ahead of time how to measure them (which could be difficult to prove) may be a prudent course as well.


(2) Limit Liability. Generally a green-building project can only be designed or built or operated with the intention of meeting sustainable goals. Other parties must perform their expected obligations and other events must fall in place as well (e.g. contractors must have access to certain materials, efficient operation & maintenance must be executed as planned, and the authorities must interpret standards and approve the design). Likewise, as noted above the costs or damages of not meeting the expected green goal can be difficult to quantify. In light of of these types of risks, contracting parties may consider include a limitation of liability with a defined maximum.


(3) Avoid Guarantees. Similarly to #2 because project participants cannot guarantee the performance of others, contractors and designers on green-building contract should make it clear that achieving the project objective depends on events outside of any one contracting party's control.


(4) Attend to Confidentiality. Confidentiality provisions must be tailored to ensure the authority-review process does not run afoul of the terms. Authorities approving sustainable projects need to have access to and the right to reproduce and display project filings. Such reproduction and disclosure may be disallowed under typical design contracts.


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The author, Katharine Kohm, is a committee member for The Dispute Resolver. Katharine practices construction law and commercial litigation in Rhode Island and Massachusetts.  She is an associate at Pierce Atwood, LLP in Providence, Rhode Island.  She may be contacted at 401-490-3407 or kkohm@PierceAtwood.com.

Thursday, May 12, 2016

Connecticut Court Upholds Arbitrators Decision that AIA A201 General Conditions Incorporated by Reference Satisfies the Connecticut Home Improvement Act Requirements

Image result for aia contractsThe plaintiffs in Paul Ippolito et al. v. Olympic Construction, LLC (AC 37437) are homeowners whose house suffered water damage resulting from a storm.  Consequently, the plaintiffs entered into a contract with the defendant to repair the damage to their home.  The contract entered into was AIA Document A133 - Standard Form of Agreement between Owner and Construction Manager as Constructor Where the Basis of Payment is the Cost of the Work plus a Fee with a Guaranteed Maximum Price.  AIA A201 – General Conditions of the Contract for Construction was also incorporated into the executed contract through reference.  Contained within the contract was the provision that all disputes arising out of the agreement would be subject to arbitration in accordance with AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules. At some point during construction operations, another storm further damaged the plaintiff’s home and plaintiffs terminated the contract with the defendant.  The defendant filed a claim for contractually mandated arbitration in order to recover its lost profits for work it had not been allowed to complete under the contract.  

The plaintiff’s defense at arbitration was that the contract was unenforceable against them because it did not comply with certain statutory requirements of Connecticut’s Home Improvement Act (HIA).  The HIA (through the Home Solicitation Sales Act) requires clear notice of the owner’s cancellation rights in the contract as well as a defined start date and completion date.  The plaintiffs claimed that the contract contained neither of these provisions.  The arbitrator found for the defendant and awarded it lost profits based upon the plaintiff’s breach of duty. The plaintiffs moved to vacate the arbitration award in Superior Court claiming the award violated public policy of the state because it ran counter to the HIA and in turn, the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the law.  The Superior Court found for the defendant and granted the defendant’s motion to confirm the arbitrator’s award. The plaintiffs appealed.

The Appellate Court of Connecticut began its review of the arbitrator’s award by examining the plaintiff’s claim that even though the contract did contain the required notice of cancellation, its location in the contract made it deficient. The statute requires that the cancellation notice be in proximity to the signature of the owner and that there be a captioned notice of cancellation attached to the contact. The plaintiff claimed that the provision was “buried” on page thirty-eight of the thirty-nine page 201 General Conditions attachment. The Appellate Court agreed with the arbitrator’s finding that the contract’s notice of cancellation complied in substance with the requirements of the HIA because A201 had been incorporated by reference in a contract line item directly above  the plaintiff’s signature.  

The Appellate Court next reviewed the plaintiff’s claim that there was no statutorily required start and completion date. The arbitrator found that, “[t]he General Conditions state in section 8.1.2: ` [t]he date of commencement of the Work is the date established in the agreement.' Section 2.3.1.1 of the agreement states: `For purposes of Section 8.1.2 of A201-2007, the date of commencement of the Work shall mean the date of commencement of the Construction Phase.' In the following section 2.3.1.2, it states, `The Construction Phase shall commence upon the Owner's acceptance of the Construction Manager's Guaranteed Maximum Price proposal or the Owner's issuance of a Notice to Proceed, whichever occurs earlier.' The completion date for the contract is defined in Section 9.8 of the General Conditions.[8] In this matter, the start dates and the completion date can be readily adduced by looking at the entire contract. . . ."  The Appellate Court stated that even if there were some “explicit, well defined, and dominant public policy” of enforcing the start and completion date requirement of the HIA, in this instance, it would fail because the current contract does not violate the requirement. 

Finally, the Appellate Court agreed with both the arbitrator and Superior Court’s findings that the contract deviated from the strict requirements of the HIA’s notice of cancellation only in a minor and technical manner and that the contract did in fact contain a starting and completion date. Accordingly, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove that arbitrator “ignored the requirements of a well-defined, explicit, and clearly applicable law” and affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. 

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The author, Brendan Carter, is a contributor to The Dispute Resolver and a former Student Division Liaison to the Forum on Construction Law.  He is an attorney and a Senior Consultant with Navigant’s Global Construction Practice based out of Boston, MA.  He may be contacted at 617.748.8311 or brendan.carter@navigant.com.

Thursday, April 28, 2016

Agreements to Arbitrate Are Simple, Right?

Ira M. Schulman, Partner, Pepper Hamilton LLP

The construction industry has been a leader in the use of arbitration to resolve disputes. In the past 30 years, it is fair to say that arbitration has outpaced litigation as the dominant method of dispute resolution. The protracted time for a construction case to get to trial and the attendant cost and expense has led the construction bar away from the courthouse and into the arbitration room. It not unusual for a lawyer bringing a construction case to court to receive a frosty reception from the judge, whose first remark is often akin to “why are you not in arbitration?” In other words, sitting through a construction trial is not among the court’s favorite pastimes.

The decision to arbitrate is made most typically, although not exclusively, by the parties’ agreement. The American Institute of Architects’ templates of construction agreements include an arbitration option wherein the parties agree that all disputes arising out of the agreement shall be determined in an arbitration to be administered pursuant to the Construction Industry Rules of the American Arbitration Association. These rules, well known to construction lawyers, provide for the orderly administration of an arbitration. Most construction lawyers, out of either lassitude or ignorance, pay scant, if any, attention to the arbitration clause. This is a mistake, perhaps a significant one, that can affect the outcome of the arbitration in numerous ways that cannot be predicted when the underlying contract is signed.

The arbitration clause is not a holy scripture that came down from Mount Sinai and cannot be altered or amended. Arbitration clauses get amended all the time, and it is up to you to decide how best to modify the standard arbitration agreement.

In addition to my law practice at Pepper Hamilton LLP, I have served as an arbitrator for the American Arbitration Association since 1987 and have presided over numerous cases both as a sole arbitrator and a member or chair of an arbitration panel. My experience has taught me that the prudent negotiation of an arbitration clause is as important to an arbitration as jury selection and jury charges are to litigation. Here is some advice:
  1. Who can demand arbitration? The standard arbitration clause allows either party to initiate an arbitration. If that is not what you want, the arbitration clause should be amended. For example, an owner may want to have an exclusive option on whether a dispute will be arbitrated or arbitration will only be allowed for disputes under a particular dollar threshold.
  1. Who will the parties be? The American Institute of Architects’ templates, not surprisingly, protect architects from being joined as parties to arbitrations unless they consent. This protection often leads to a situation where the owner and general contractor are in one arbitration and the owner and architect are in a separate arbitration. This arrangement frequently results in inconsistent results and very unhappy owners. If the thought of this keeps you or your client awake at night, modify your arbitration clause to allow for liberal consolidation so that all disputes arising from one project are determined in one arbitration. 
  1. Who will be the arbitrator(s)? Unless your arbitration clause addresses this issue, your arbitrator will be selected by mutual agreement of the parties or, failing that, by administrative appointment. Too frequently, arbitration panels consist of all lawyers. Before the contract is signed, ensure that one arbitrator will be a contractor or design professional — or you may exclude lawyers altogether. If your adversary is very well-known in town and you or your client are less well-known or not known at all, you should require that none of the arbitrators can be from the local jurisdiction. It is appropriate to require that arbitrator(s) have a minimum number of years of experience in their specialty.
  1. How many arbitrators? Absent express agreement, the number of arbitrators who will hear your case is determined by the entity that administers the arbitration. The American Arbitration Association uses a $1 million threshold. If the claim is equal or less than the threshold, one arbitrator is assigned; if greater, three arbitrators are assigned. Why should you be concerned? A few reasons: given the arbitrator’s extremely wide latitude in his/her management of the case, casting your lot with one arbitrator can be an extremely risky proposition. If you or your client successfully alienates a solo arbitrator, your case is in deep trouble. For that reason, many counsel insist on three-member panels. On the other hand, the costs of a three-member panel can easily surpass $10,000 per day, excluding the arbitrators’ incidental expenses, which can include meals and lodging in a swanky hotel.
  1. Where will the arbitration be held? Arbitration clauses are often silent on this issue. Do not leave this point to the discretion of the administering agency. Clearly state where the arbitration must be held. Remember that requiring your arbitration to be held in New York City could have you traveling to Staten Island. You are better to state the venue as New York County.
  1. How much discovery will be permitted? One of the perceived advantages to arbitration is that the money-burning discovery so common in litigation is nowhere to be seen. Discovery in litigation can take too long and can be too expensive. However, are you certain that your case would not benefit from modest discovery? For example, allowing each side to take two fact witness depositions and a deposition of each expert witness, where each deposition does not exceed seven hours, may be a prudent use of resources.
  1. What rules of evidence will govern? One of the nasty surprises that may await a party in arbitration is the haphazard application of the rules of evidence. The American Arbitration Association encourages arbitrators to accept evidence that will foster an understanding of the dispute. Unfortunately, some arbitrators allow everything into the record with the refrain of “I’ll take it for what it’s worth,” while other arbitrators are far more restrictive.
The arbitration clause is the place to take control of this issue. For example, the clause could read, “the Rules of Evidence shall be as set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that hearsay testimony may be admitted but the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant shall be considered in determining the weight to be afforded to the proposed testimony or document.” In reading the rules of the American Arbitration Association, it is surprising that arbitrators are not required to exclude evidence on the grounds of privilege, e.g., attorney-client or settlement discussions. The risk of having an adverse inference drawn against your case because of your justified refusal to produce a privileged document can easily be dealt with in the arbitration clause.
  1. How long will the arbitration take? Clients are often disappointed or outright angry over the length of time to complete an arbitration. After all, one of the major selling points of this form of dispute resolution is its relative speed compared to litigation. Unfortunately, due to scheduling conflicts, especially with a panel of three arbitrators, arbitrations seldom proceed from start to finish in consecutive days. Rather, there are often gaps between hearing days lasting days, weeks or, in some cases, months. The arbitration clause is a good place to set express deadlines. For example, the clause could state that “the parties agree that the Arbitration shall be completed in not more than ## days measured from the appointment of the arbitrator(s).” This clause will assist the administering entity in selecting arbitrator(s) who can meet this commitment.
  1. Attorney’s Fees and Costs. Absent an agreement to the contrary or controlling statute, the “American Rule” provides that each side bears its own legal fees. The arbitration clause is a good place to provide for a mandatory award of attorney’s fees in favor of the prevailing party. Of course, if you or your client is likely to be the respondent in the arbitration, you may wish to omit this clause. As for the costs of the arbitration — which may well include arbitrator compensation (which in complex cases can run into the six figures) — I often include the provision that “The costs and fees of the arbitration, including arbitrator compensation shall be borne as incurred and the arbitrator(s) are without power to apportion them.”
  1. Modification of Award. The rules of the American Arbitration Association only allow an arbitrator to modify the award if there is a computational error or other similar imperfection. The arbitrator may not revisit any of his/her substantive conclusions. You could allow a party to request the arbitrator to revisit the merits of the award, especially where the arbitration is conducted before one arbitrator who may simply have swung and missed. The clause should include a tight time frame for this request and, to avoid having the other side incur needless legal fees, that party should not be required to respond to the modification request unless the arbitrator directs it.
The above ten points are far from exhaustive, but they should encourage you or your attorney to pay closer attention to boilerplate arbitration clauses.

Article originally posted March 31, 2016 on Constructlaw, an update and discussion of recent trends in construction law and construction, maintained and edited by Pepper Hamilton's Construction Law Practice Group. 

Friday, April 22, 2016

Amount in Controversy Not a Barrier to Federal Court Review of Arbitration Award


In Pershing, LLC v. Kiebach, 2016 WL 1375874 (5th Cir. April 6, 2016), the 5th Circuit considered an interlocutory appeal whether the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a case that involved an arbitration award of only $10,000.  The 5th Circuit "adopting the better reasoned approach" concluded yes.

The underlying matter concerned an alleged Ponzi scheme.  Investors (Kiebach and others) claimed that a clearing broker agent of Pershing failed to disclose adverse financial information causing them $80 million in damages.  After a two week hearing, a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") panel found against the investors' claims, but awarded them $10,000 in compensation for "certain arbitration-related expenses." Pershing filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award in federal court pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").  The investors moved to dismiss because, although the parties were diverse, the amount in controversy was only $10,000, not the threshold amount of greater than $75,000.

Noting that federal courts diverge, the 5th Circuit observed that the "courts that have confronted this issue generally follow one of two approaches—the award approach or the demand approach."  As the name would suggest, the "award approach" determines the amount in controversy based on the "underlying arbitration award regardless of the amount sought."  In contrast, the "demand approach" ties the amount in controversy to "amount sought in the underlying arbitration." Based on the Investors' arbitration demand of $80 million, the district court had decided that the $75,000 amount in controversy was met.  The 5th Circuit agreed.

The 5th Circuit's rationale relied three points.  "First, the demand approach recognizes the true scope of the controversy between the parties."  The Court observed that the Investors were likely opposing the confirmation of the award because they were not satisfied with $10,000 on their original $80 million claim.  Second, "the demand approach avoids the application of two conflicting jurisdictional tests for the same controversy." Essentially using the award approach would result in two different jurisdictional outcomes at the beginning of the arbitration and at the end.  In other words, a motion to compel arbitration, based on the amount claimed (if more than $75,000), could be heard by the court.  But then, for the exact same case, the motion to confirm the later arbitration award (if ultimately less than $75,000) could not be heard by the court.  This dichotomy is irrational and would possibly promote "gamesmanship" of filing motions for arbitration at the start of the case in order to "to preserve their right to a federal forum for review of the eventual award."  The third rationale for using demand approach was that the jurisdictional outcome would be the same had the case been arbitrated or litigated. 

The concurring opinion pointed out that while the demand approach was appropriate in this case, it was not "necessary or advisable to adopt any such general approach" for all cases going forward.  Rather the concurring judge believed the better approach was to take each matter on a case-by-case basis on its facts.

Wednesday, April 13, 2016

You’re Holding Me Up: My Week Spent Back on a Jobsite

“Who’s this guy?”

That’s the look I got from some folks and it’s a look I knew all too well. I flashed it many times as an onsite project engineer and project manager.  On one particular jobsite I was on, we would joke about the starched white shirt/pressed jeans guys who would be posted up in the trailer conference room occasionally for matters that were above our pay grade.  For the first time a few weeks ago, I was one of those guys as I spent my first prolonged period of time on a large jobsite since becoming an attorney. 

I was sent to the South to a large industrial project that was just reaching critical mass of construction operations with over 700 tradesmen onsite and multiple shifts running 7 days a week.  As I walked onsite and into the trailer complex, the intensity and buzz of the site was palpable, and it surprised me how much I missed that aspect of construction.  My role for the week was to simply begin compiling facts in order to status certain contracts for the owner.  I did this through collecting documents and interviews with the owner’s supervisory field staff.  At first, I had some difficulty in my new role as a passive observer rather than a proactive participant in the actual building operations. I found myself at times having to suppress the construction manager remnants of my brain when process and future operational concerns were being discussed.  I reminded myself that I was no longer a field guy and in my current capacity, I needed  to dial it back to stick to the task at hand of information gathering, not getting into fervent discussions of panel attachment details and efficient trade sequencing.

Through the contract document review I conducted prior to arriving onsite, I knew the contractual relationships and who might be in trouble.  The office I was placed in was located next to the large general conference room where marathon coordination meetings were taking place and I worked with the door open in order to better understand the project.  Knowing who was in the crosshairs, there were times when I winced at things said from an owner standpoint, and at other times when subcontractors were speaking I wanted to yell out the door, ‘SOMEONE WRITE THAT DOWN! WE’LL NEED THAT LATER!”

By the end of the week, I had slipped back into the comfortable rhythm of a jobsite, something that is missing in an office environment.  There are times of the day that have certain feels to them; the sacrosanct coffee break, the quiet, almost peaceful lull of lunch, and wrap up time in the late afternoon as the shadows get longer.  A few days, I found myself out on the deck watching the tradesmen file out of the gate and thought wistfully of my time spent onsite and how I might want to get back into it.  Then I would snap back with the reality of the monumental task and the crushing and all-consuming pressure this team would experience over the next year in order to complete the project on time. Accordingly, I quickly remembered why I made the decision to go to law school.  I found that jobsites and their intensity are a nice place to visit, but me and my starched shirts had a plane to catch to get back to the office to start reviewing documents and begin writing.

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The author, Brendan Carter, is a contributor to The Dispute Resolver and a former Student Division Liaison to the Forum on Construction Law.  He is an attorney and a Senior Consultant with Navigant’s Global Construction Practice based out of Boston, MA.  He may be contacted at 617.748.8311 or brendan.carter@navigant.com.

Monday, April 11, 2016

Guest Post: Schedule Errors -- To Correct or Not to Correct? by Fritz T. Marth, PE, CFCC, Senior Managing Consultant at GREYHAWK

The Dispute Resolver is proud to offer the following guest post by Fritz T. Marth, PE, CFCC, Senior Managing Consultant at GREYHAWK.  We are grateful to Fritz for his contribution and insightful post.  Please click here to learn more about Fritz and GREYHAWK.

Schedule Errors – To Correct or Not to Correct?
By Fritz T. Marth, PE, CFCC
Senior Managing Consultant at GREYHAWK


The forensic analysis of critical path delays to project milestones, as part of claims and litigation, initially involves the assessment of the baseline schedule.  While there is often a temptation to “correct” critical path method schedules prior to or during the schedule analysis process, one should always think twice before doing so.  It is best to remember the old adage that, “no good deed goes unpunished.”  No matter how genuine the desire to perform an accurate and objective analysis may be, that genuineness will be challenged anytime changes to contemporaneous project documents, including schedules, are made after the fact.  That is not to say that there are not very legitimate reasons for corrections to a schedule, or any other project document for that matter; however, many times these corrections can be addressed by way of explanation rather than by way of change.

For example, when clear cases of improper sequencing occur, such as a schedule indicating a wall being constructed before its footing is placed, the temptation to correct exists.  This makes sense, especially if the original critical path progresses through the wall, and then moves into something other than the scheduled footing.  In that case, a good argument could be made that that critical path is in error, and would actually be increased in duration since proper sequencing would require footing placement before wall construction.  At this point in the analysis however, the analyst should stop and ask themselves some questions, such as:

  • Going forward in time on the project (taking advantage of the benefit of hindsight), was the critical path, or the actual work, in fact influenced as a result of this sequencing error?

  • Will addressing this sequencing error as simply resulting in a de facto schedule impact provide a more understandable and accurate analysis than making an upfront change to the schedule which could affect the schedule “downstream,” in a way that would never have occurred?

If the answer to the first question is “no” or the answer to the second question “yes,” the error is likely better addressed by explanation than by change.  In doing so, full acknowledgement of the error is made, the effect of the error accounted for, and any arguments about the credibility of “making changes to the plan after the fact” avoided.  The more objective the analysis is the more credible the analysis is, and any changes made by an analyst necessarily introduce subjectivity.  Finally, one should always be mindful that when performing a schedule analysis without the benefit of having access to the scheduler, what may appear as an obvious error, may in fact not be one.