Sunday, October 3, 2021

Flow-Down Showdown: The Interplay of Arbitration Agreements and Flow-Down Provisions


Flow-down, or pass-through, provisions are among the most important provisions in all subcontracts, at least from the perspective of general contractors. These classic risk-transfer provisions provide that the subcontractor will be bound to the general contractor in the same fashion that the general contractor is bound under its contract with the owner. (As a practical matter, general contractors must provide access to the owner contract in order for the flow-down provision to be enforceable against the subcontractor. Prudent general contractors ought to redact sensitive information, including business terms (like their fee and other aspects of the deal) and bank wire transfer information.) These provisions are often accompanied with language throughout the subcontract that dually requires the subcontractor to follow the prime contract between the owner and the general contractor, in the event there exists a conflict or gap between provisions in the subcontract and the prime contract. For example, a prudent general contractor could draft a notice provision that requires a subcontractor to submit notice in writing within a desired amount of days and include the language “unless the General Contract Documents require notice sooner.” In short, flow-down provisions are a nice backstop for general contractors to ensure that they are following the requirements set forth in their contracts with the owner. 

However, even the best of backstops have their limits – and such limits often come to light in the face of agreements to arbitrate. In a recent flow-down showdown, the California Court of Appeals illustrated these limits when it refused to enforce an arbitration agreement that was flowed-down from a prime contract. See Remedial Construction Services, LP v. AECOM, INC., 65 Cal. App. 5th 658, 666 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2021). There, the subcontract incorporated by reference a prime contract that included an arbitration agreement and required, like all flow-down provisions do, that the subcontractor assume towards the general contractor “all obligations and responsibilities contained in the Prime Agreement.” Notably, the subcontract itself did not contain an agreement to arbitrate. The court thus found that since “[t]he Subcontract [did] not evidence an intention, clear or otherwise, for arbitration of disputes,” the agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable against the subcontractor in its disputes with the general contractor.

For those tracking flow-down showdowns, this result was unsurprising. Just over a decade earlier, the New York Court of Appeals came out the same way in a very similar case. See Wonder Works Construction Corp. v. R.C. Dolner, Inc., 73 A.D.3d 511, 514 (N.Y. App. 1st Dep’t 2010). There, a subcontract also lacked an agreement to arbitrate and, instead, simply incorporated by reference the prime contract which contained such agreement. Like California, the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that an arbitration agreement must be unambiguous in expressing a clear intent of both parties to arbitrate disputes. Id. at 513; see Remedial Construction Services, 65 Cal. App. 5th at 661 (“In the absence of a clear agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration, we will not infer a waiver of a party’s jury trial rights.” (citing Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. 218 Cal. App. 4th 50, 59 (2013)).

To avoid having their own flow-down showdowns, general contractors – and their lawyers – must keep in mind that the duty to arbitrate can only be imposed by clear written agreement. See 9 USC § 2; New York Convention of the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Article II. As recognized by the Supreme Court in the series of cases known as the ‘‘Steelworkers Trilogy,’’ ‘‘arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which [it] has not agreed so to submit.’’ United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960); accord AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986). Since “[a]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which [it] has not agreed so to submit,” determining who actually agreed to arbitrate is always a threshold matter. See “Steelworkers Trilogy”; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. (quoting Moses H. Cone) (“The first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute. The court is to make this determination by applying the ‘federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the [Federal Arbitration] Act.’”).

The best way to achieve both a clear agreement to arbitrate with a subcontractor and one that is not in conflict with the dispute resolution procedures in the owner contract is to draft a flow-down dispute resolution provision that explicitly references arbitration. So, just like how prudent general contractors can draft notice provisions that require subcontractors to submit notice in writing within a desired amount of days, “unless the General Contract Documents require notice sooner,” the same can be drafted in the dispute resolution context. For example, a subcontract should explicitly provide that disputes must be resolved in strict conformance with the General Contract Documents. The subcontract should also provide that, “at the election of the General Contractor,” disputes will be arbitrated or submitted to court of a specified location (either a convenient jurisdiction for the general contractor or the project). The arbitration agreement should provide (1) the rules of arbitration, generally it is the American Arbitration Association’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, (2) the situs of the arbitration, (3) the number of arbitrators, (4) consideration of a nominal sum included in the subcontract price, and (5) a waiver to jury trial, in all-capitals. The rule of thumb when it comes to arbitration agreements is to keep them clear. And that same clarity should be carried forth by flowing-down the requirements of the owner contract – nobody wants to be in the position of both litigating and arbitrating essentially the same case because the arbitration was not fully agreed to.

In the event your agreement lacks a clear agreement to arbitrate, courts,* like those in Remedial Construction Services and Wonder Works, must determine the scope of the arbitration clause at issue, so as to determine what the parties actually agreed to do. The Federal Arbitration Act (or “FAA”) provides a liberal policy of promoting arbitration because it was drafted to override the then long-standing judicial hostility towards arbitration and to make arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 9 USC § 2; Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (noting that courts are to “rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.”) So, on the one hand, if a court determines that an arbitration clause exists, “any doubt concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Id. at 24. However, it is “equally clear that the ‘federal policy alone cannot be enough to extend the application of an arbitration clause far beyond its intended scope.’” Fuller v. Gutherie, 565 F.2d 259, 261 (2d Cir. 1977). “After all, the purpose of the FAA ‘was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.’” Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967). Thus, on the other hand, arbitration cannot be compelled unless it is found that both of the parties (1) agreed to arbitrate and (2) intended the arbitration clause to cover the particular dispute. Another way to avoid being a party to the arbitration agreement is to assert that you lack the ability to pay. In such scenarios, there is a possibility that the fees of an arbitration (like the institutional ones and the ones going to the tribunal, but not the legal fees) might provide a basis for invalidating an arbitration agreement in its entirety. In other words, the right to be heard trumps the federal policy favoring arbitration. 

In conclusion, general contractors ought to continue transferring risk through flow-down provisions, but must be particularly prudent in the face of agreements to arbitrate. Again, the best way to achieve the upper hand is by explicitly reinforcing the application of the flow-down provision and referencing the agreement to arbitrate within the subcontract. And, if a subcontractor challenges the applicability of arbitration, at least you brought the bigger gloves to the fight.

* Note, however, that pursuant to the Doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, arbitrators are competent enough to decide their jurisdiction. See Schein v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019) (upholding this principle in a recent January 2019 case where parties contracted to have an arbitrator decide not only the merits of a particular dispute, but also gateway questions of arbitrability). Thus, court interference may not be necessary at this initial jurisdiction stage.


Author Lexie Pereira is a JD/MBA candidate at Boston College Law School and Carroll School of Management graduating in Spring 2022 and studying to become a litigator, with a specialty in construction law. Currently, she works as a Law Clerk at Consigli Construction Co., Inc., serves on the Editorial Team of the ABA’s Forum on Construction Law’s Dispute Resolver blog, and acts as the Student Liaison of the ABA's Forum on Construction Law. At school, Lexie is the President of the Real Estate Law Society and the President of the Eagle-to-Eagle Mentoring Program. Lexie grew up in the construction industry and has spent time working as an estimator, field engineer, laborer, and, of course, in the legal capacity at Consigli and formerly Hinckley Allen and Pillsbury as a Summer Associate. After graduation, she will be joining Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP as an Associate.

Contact Lexie: pereirle@bc.edu | https://www.linkedin.com/in/lexie-pereira/

 

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