In Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL IrrevocableTrust, 2013 WL 4609100, -- F.3d – (2d Cir. 8/30/2013), the Court
affirmed the District Court’s denial of an action to vacate an arbitration
award.
The dispute concerned the
ownership of a life insurance policy.
Claimant alleged that the respondents had materially breached their
obligation to pay the insurance premiums and therefore claimant became the sole
owner of the policy. The parties agreed
to submit their dispute to a panel of three rabbis (“the Panel”) to arbitrate
the contract dispute. Each party
selected an arbitrator and they both selected the third, neutral
arbitrator. After seven or eight
sessions (for more than 30 hours total) and one fact witness, the Panel issued
an award in favor of the claimant.
Respondents moved to
enjoin the enforcement of the arbitration award and for vacatur of the
same. The District Court confirmed the
arbitration award and denied respondents action for vacatur.
On appeal, the Second
Circuit framed the issue as follows:
Whether
there was ‘abundantly clear’ evidence of corruption to vacate the arbitration
award under the FAA, where (1) no records of the arbitration proceeding were
kept; (2) all parties agreed that the arbitrators could reach their decision by
any legal, factual or other basis; (3) an affidavit submitted to the district
court alleged that the neutral arbitrator was overhead promising one of the
parties a favorable ruling; (4) the affiant testified that he was threatened
for making his testimony; and (5) the arbitration panel issued its ruling with
only two of the three arbitrators present.
Kolel, at *4.
The Second Circuit
confirmed that its standard for vacating an award under the “corruption” ground
of section 10(a)(2) was the same standard as under section 10(a) for
“corruption, fraud, or undue influence” – “[e]vidence of corruption must be abundantly clear in order to vacate an
award.” Kolel, at *3 (emphasis added). The evidence must be “direct and not
speculative.” Kolel, at *3, 5. Denial
is appropriate where “a reasonable person would not “have to” conclude that [an arbitrator] was partial to a [party], or
biased against [parties challenging the award].”Kolel, at *6.
Although the Court
referenced the appellate record had a substantial amount of “he-said, she-said”
conflicting accounts, the Court found “only one affidavit that is from an
individual without an obvious stake
in the outcome of the arbitration and with
firsthand knowledge of the pertinent facts or evidence.” Kolel, at *5. That witness stated that he overhead the
neutral arbitrator tell a non-party to inform the claimant that the Panel would
be issuing a favorable decision to claimant.
The Court found that the appellants failed to prove with clear and
convincing evidence “corruption.” Kolel,
at *6. Even accepting the assertions in
the affidavit as true, the appellants “failed to suggest – let alone prove –
what, if anything, [the neutral arbitrator] stood to gain or what special
connection he had with [claimant] that would have given plausible reason to
corrupt his decision.” Kolel, at *6.
In addition, the Second
Circuit found that vacatur was not required given that the award was made after
only one witness testified. “The Panel’s
decision to hear only one witness does not make the arbitration fundamentally
unfair.” Kolel, at *7. The Court explained that particularly where
the issue is one of contractual interpretation, a question of law, reference to
external evidence is not necessarily required. Kolel, at *7. The Court
reaffirmed its recent holding, in LJL
33rd St. Assoc., LLC v. Pitcairn Props., Inc. 2013 WL 3927615, -- F.3d --,
at *8, that “[a]rbitrators have substantial discretion to admit or exclude
evidence.”
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